The decision to share Enigma decryption techniques and two reconstructed Enigma machines with the British and French in July 1939 was made by Major General Tadeusz Pełczyński. It was a gift to their new allies and entirely unrelated to the ongoing German improvements in Enigma OpSec. The Poles had already defeated the improvements in Enigma OpSec, but did not have the time to do so regularly with the war impending. The Germans imposed a ten fold increase in the number of operations required to solve an Enigma encryption. Neither Britain or France had ever decrypted Enigma communications up to this time.
Poles continued to decrypt Enigma signals traffic after the fall of Poland at PC Bruno, a French SigInt facility located in the Château de Vignolles in Gretz-Armainvilliers, southeast of Paris and commanded by Major Gustave Bertrand. Decryption commenced at PC Bruno on 17 January 1940. We know that they decrypted 5,084 Enigma communications from 10 May to 10 June 1940 during the fall of France.
Some of the Poles - including Marian Rejewski, Jerzy Różycki, Piotr Smoleński, Jan Graliński, and Henryk Zygalski - were reestablished at PC Cadix in the south of France, again under the command of Major Bertrand, where they resumed solving Enigma encryptions. The PC Cadix Poles had to decamp for England on 9 November 1942 when the Germans occupied the south of France. The British accepted none of the Poles at Bletchley Park, ostensibly because of their work for Vichy France, despite their continued support of Bletchley Park operations during their operatins at PC Cadix.
Bletchley Park was thoroughly infiltrated by Soviet agents, notably by John Cairncross who supplied the Soviets with more than 5,000 Enigma decrypts. Alan Turing attended Cambridge at the same time as Anthony Blunt and Guy Burgess, two other members of the Cambridge Five Soviet spy ring. The British have gone to great lengths to minimize the size and scope of the Cambridge Five spy ring, but Venona decrypts suggest that it was much larger than the five publicly acknowledged members. This is my problem with Turing.
What on earth does a soviet agent have to do with whether the Poles or the Brits were consistently generating reliable, actionable intelligence from Enigma... and if you want to go off on tangents please remember I have already mentioned the German spy working in the US Navy that told the Germans we were reading their messages.
Simple question: Was the formation of the new department of the OSS to deal with ULTRA's information handling predominantly British transcripts or Polish?
The Poles were able to keep pace with the evolutionary improvements in German Enigma OpSec into 1942, at which point the Kriegsmarine adopted a fourth, stationary rotor and reflector. The British officially ascribe this dramatic improvement in Enigma encription to Admiral Doenitz's intuition, but that intuition was most probably informed by the Abwehr which was closely affiliated with the Kriegsmarine. The Abwehr actually adopted the four rotor Enigma machines before the Kriegsmarine.
The Abwehr was not acting upon intuition. They had long cracked Soviet diplomatic and military codes and knew that the Soviets were being fed Enigma decryptions by the British. The Abwehr probably also knew of the Cambridge Five+. So it was the Cambridge Five who were ultimately responsible for lifting Enigma OpSec beyond the capabilities of the Poles. It is only at this point in time that Bletchley Park surpasses the ability of the Poles to solve Enigma encryptions.
It is worth noting that Kriegsmarine OpSec eventually surpasses Bletchley Park capabilities in 1944. Bletchley Park had to install American NCR made computers to continue solving Enigma encryptions, replacing Turing's bombs. By 1944, Bletchley Park employed 10,000 personnel supported by another 15,000 personnel in the United States. The Polish cryptanalysis operations never exceeded 50 personnel.
OSS had nothing to do with Enigma solutions. The U.S. Navy cryptanalysis office OP-20-G lead American efforts with assistance from the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Service.
10x25:
Thank you for making my point so succinctly even while avoiding the actual question posed...
What you have just admitted is that the Germans had failed to adequately protect their transmissions against decryption. They _thought_ that they had protected it technologically but failed to realize how much treasure the British were willing to invest in defeating Enigma. By failing to properly address the economic risk and relying only upon the perceived technological protection they were left wanting. Thus Britain _defeated_ Enigma.By 1944, Bletchley Park employed 10,000 personnel supported by another 15,000 personnel in the United States. The Polish cryptanalysis operations never exceeded 50 personnel.
Once again, it is very important that you sit back and truly consider the intent of encryption - that being keeping the information secret until it is useless to the enemy. The ability to decrypt dribs and drabs based on the theory that every now and again a blind squirrel finds a nut is not an acceptable basis for a war altering intelligence system.
PS: Those NCR "fast Bombes" made by NCR in Dayton, Ohio had Alan Turing's fingerprints all over them:-
Banburismus was a cryptographic analysis system developed by Turning and was used operationally by the end of 1940.Alan Turing, who had written a memorandum to OP-20-G (probably in 1941), was seconded to the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington in December 1942, because of his exceptionally wide knowledge about the bombes and the methods of their use. He was asked to look at the bombes that were being built by NCR and at the security of certain speech cipher equipment under development at Bell Labs. He visited OP-20-G, and went to NCR in Dayton on the 21 December. He was able to show that it was not necessary to build 336 Bombes, one for each possible rotor order, by utilising techniques such as Banburismus. The initial order was scaled down to 96 machines.
The American bombe was in its essentials the same as the English bombe though it functioned rather better as they were not handicapped by having to make it, as Keen was forced to do owing to production difficulties, on the framework of a 3 wheel machine. By late autumn [1943] new American machines were coming into action at the rate of about 2 a week, the ultimate total being in the region of 125Regarding the Kriegsmarine Enigma. The fleetwide addition of the fourth rotor and second reflector, (introduced in early 1942), did prevent decryption. But in December 1941 a U boat transmitted a message with the 4th rotor in the wrong place and then re-transmitted it with it in the right position which, along with the subsequent capture of the new machine from another U boat in early 1942, helped Bletchley Park to determine the new wiring and by the end of 1942 they were back in the business of consistent, reliable intelligence gathering.When the Americans began to turn out bombes in large numbers there was a constant interchange of signal - cribs, keys, message texts, cryptographic chat and so on. This all went by cable being first encyphered on the combined Anglo-American cypher machine, C.C.M. Most of the cribs being of operational urgency rapid and efficient communication was essential and a high standard was reached on this; an emergency priority signal consisting of a long crib with crib and message text repeated as a safeguard against corruption would take under an hour from the time we began to write the signal out in Hut 8 to the completion of its decyphering in Op. 20 G. As a result of this we were able to use the Op. 20 G bombes almost as conveniently as if they had been at one of our outstations 20 or 30 miles away.
Production was stopped in September 1944 after 121 bombes had been made.
This is a fascinating conversation...
Major General Pełczyński was fairly clever in deploying the Poles' limited decryption resources. They used RDF in both Poland and France to select the German transmitters whose messages were worth decryption. He had little interest in weather reports from the Arctic or South American military attache reports. His particular interest were transmissions from OKW and OKH in Zossen, the OKL just outside of Berlin, and the Abwehr in Brandenberg. Keep in mind that once one such message was solved, the remaining messages transmitted by the source on that date were easily solved.
The Americans and British were not so selective. They always knew the weather in the Arctic.
actually we had nothing (no americans remember) everything here was yours (british people remember) we just took it from you, you were too weak to keep it
you lot had everything here and the most powerful navy in the world to supply you...and still you lost
as far as the logistical problems of bringing more stuff in, you guys had it worked out well enough to build a wide reaching Empire...i guess its easier to subjugate/conquer/colonize some uneducated, untrained, unequipped, unmotivated bushpeople
so basically you are saying you could have beat us but you just didnt want to...LOL havent heard that excuse since grade schoolwith other world issues the British Empire had to deal with at the time you weren't high on the list of priorities...
i knew you were from england but always thought you were a citizen
wsr:
That conversation is so... last week... Please try to keep up, you've missed an entire education regarding cryptanalysis and the Enigma machine... You should read it all, very enlightening.